

# Stale pointers are the new black

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# Stale pointers are the new black

ZDI-09-041: Microsoft Internet Explorer 8 Rows Property Dangling Pointer  
Code Execution Vulnerability  
<http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-09-041>  
June 10, 2009

-- CVE ID:  
CVE-2009-1532

-- Affected Vendors:  
Microsoft

-- Affected Products:  
Microsoft Internet Explorer

CVE-2010-3257

Severity  
High

Description  
A code execution vulnerability exists in Apple Safari. The vulnerability is due to a stale pointer issue with focusing. A remote attacker can entice a target user to open a maliciously crafted web page.

The specific flaw exists in js3250.dll. When a JavaObject is created, there is not a proper sanity check for the LookupGetterOrSetter() function, which can result in a dangling pointer being passed to the JS\_ValueToId() function. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code.

The flaw is caused due to a use-after-free error in WebKit when rendering HTML buttons, which could be exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code via a specially crafted web page.

The specific flaw exists during deallocation of memory for a CAttrArray object. If the CAttrArray object has been freed memory during the deallocation of the webpage, the application will access can lead to code execution under the context of the currently logged in user.

Dangling pointer crash regression from plugin parameter

**Title:**

array fix

**Impact:** Critical

**Announced:** July 20, 2010

**Reporter:** Daniel Holbert

**Products:** Firefox 3.6.7

or attacks may also

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable software utilizing Apple's WebKit library. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page.

**Title:** TreeColumns dangling pointer  
**Impact:** Critical  
**Announced:** September 9, 2009  
**Reporter:** TippingPoint ZDI  
**Products:** Firefox

The specific flaw exists in the handling of the run-in value for display CSS styles. A specially crafted web page can cause a use after free() condition in WebKit's WebCore::RenderBlock() method. This can be leveraged by attackers to execute arbitrary code under the context of the current user.

A vulnerability has been identified in Microsoft Office Excel that could compromise a vulnerable system. This issue is caused by a use-after-free in "mshtml.dll" when processing certain JavaScript event objects, which could trick a user into visiting a specially crafted web page.

Webkit  
Attackers  
be possibl

II. DESCRIPTION

AVUPEN Vulnerability Research Team discovered a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Office Excel.

The vulnerability is caused by a dangling pointer when processing certain Formula records in an Excel file, which could be exploited by remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by tricking a user into opening a specially crafted Excel document.

# Motivations



@0xcharlie

Charlie Miller

But srsly, how do you compete  
with @taviso? He reports all my  
Flash and Reader o-days.  
Senseless slaughter of bugs, I'm  
quitting infosec.

17 Aug via web  Favorite  Retweet  Reply


# Different approaches then..




# .. Or Static Analysis!

- Abstract interpretation
  - Data-flow analysis
    - **Pointer analysis**
    - Shape analysis
- Model Checking
- Theorem Proving

# Our Idea



# How it works



# Intermediate language interlude



# Enter REIL

- Small RISC instruction set (17 instructions)
  - Arithmetic: ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV, MOD, BSH
  - Bitwise: AND, OR, XOR
  - Conditional: BISZ, JCC
  - Data transfer: LDM, STM, STR
  - Others: NOP, UNDEF, UNKN
- Register machine
- Unlimited number of temp registers
- Side effect free
- No exceptions, floating point, 64Bit, ..

# Example: assembly x86 → REIL

```
00001EB0  WebCore.idb::__ZNK7WebCore16AbstractDatabase14securityOriginEv
00001EB0  push    ebp
00001EB1  mov     ebp, esp
00001EB3  mov     eax, ss:[ebp+arg_0]
00001EB6  mov     eax, ds:[eax+0xC]
00001EB9  leave
00001EBA  retn
```

```
001EB000  sub    esp, 0x4, qword t0          // 00001EB0 push ebp
001EB001  and    qword t0, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp
001EB002  stm    ebp, , esp
001EB100  str    esp, , ebp
001EB300  add    0x8, ebp, qword t0          // 00001EB1 mov ebp, esp
001EB301  and    qword t0, 0xFFFFFFFF, t1
001EB302  ldm    t1, , t2
001EB303  str    t2, , eax
001EB600  add    0xC, eax, qword t0          // 00001EB3 mov eax, ss: [ebp + arg_0]
001EB601  and    qword t0, 0xFFFFFFFF, t1
001EB602  ldm    t1, , t2
001EB603  str    t2, , eax
001EB900  str    ebp, , esp
001EB901  ldm    esp, , ebp
001EB902  add    esp, 0x4, qword t0
001EB903  and    qword t0, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp
001EBA00  ldm    esp, , t0
001EBA01  add    esp, 0x4, qword t1
001EBA02  and    qword t1, qword 0xFFFFFFFF, esp
001EBA03  jcc    0x1, , t0
```


# Single Static Assignment Form



# Flavours

- Non-pruned
- Semi-pruned
- Pruned

# Non-locales



# Algorithm

- Find non-locales
- Place phi-functions
- Recursively rename variables

# A function

```
001E7000    sub      esp, 0x4, qword t0          // 00001E70 push ebp
001E7001    and      qword t0, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp
001E7002    stm      ebp, , esp
001E7100    str      esp, , ebp                  // 00001E71 mov ebp, esp
001E7300    sub      esp, 0x4, qword t0          // 00001E73 call cs: 7800
001E7301    and      qword t0, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp
001E7302    stm      0x1E78, , esp
001E7303    jcc      0x1, , 0x1E78
```



```
001E7800    ldm      esp, , t0          // 00001E78 pop ecx
001E7801    add      esp, 0x4, qword t1
001E7802    and      qword t1, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp
001E7803    str      t0, , ecx
001E7900    add      0xD96D04, ecx, qword t0      // 00001E79 movzx eax, byte ds: [ecx + 14249220]
001E7901    and      qword t0, 0xFFFFFFFF, t1
001E7902    ldm      t1, , byte t2
001E7903    or       0x0, byte t2, eax
001E8000    str      ebp, , esp            // 00001E80 leave
001E8001    ldm      esp, , ebp
001E8002    add      esp, 0x4, qword t0
001E8003    and      qword t0, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp
001E8100    ldm      esp, , t0          // 00001E81 retn
001E8101    add      esp, 0x4, qword t1
001E8102    and      qword t1, qword 0xFFFFFFFF, esp
001E8103    jcc      0x1, , t0
```

# In SSA Form

```
001E7000    sub      esp_0, sub_4, qword t0_1
001E7001    and      qword t0_1, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp_1
001E7002    stm      ebp_0, , esp_2
001E7100    str      esp_2, , ebp_1
001E7300    sub      esp_2, sub_4, qword t0_2
001E7301    and      qword t0_2, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp_3
001E7302    stm      0x1E78, , esp_4
001E7303    jcc      0x1, , 0x1E78
```




```
001E7800    ldm      esp_4, , t0_3
001E7801    add      esp_4, sub_4, qword t1_1
001E7802    and      qword t1_1, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp_5
001E7803    str      t0_3, , ecx_1
001E7900    add      0XD96D04, ecx_1, qword t0_4
001E7901    and      qword t0_4, 0xFFFFFFFF, t1_2
001E7902    ldm      t1_2, , byte t2_1
001E7903    or       0x0, byte t2_1, eax_1
001E8000    str      ebp_1, , esp_6
001E8001    ldm      esp_6, , ebp_2
001E8002    add      esp_6, sub_4, qword t0_5
001E8003    and      qword t0_5, 0xFFFFFFFF, esp_7
001E8100    ldm      esp_7, , t0_6
001E8101    add      esp_7, sub_4, qword t1_3
001E8102    and      qword t1_3, qword 0xFFFFFFFF, esp_8
001E8103    jcc      0x1, , t0_6
```

# Φ function



Detour...Abstract  
interpretation

# Abstract Interpretation



# Abstract Interpretation..formally

Give several semantics linked by  
relations of abstraction

# Abstract Interpretation..intuitively

Partial execution of the program which tracks only part of information about its semantics, without performing all the calculations

# MonoREIL



# So what you need?

- The control flow graph of a function
- A way to walk the CFG
- The lattice
  - Its elements
  - A way to combine lattice elements
- An initial state
- REIL instructions effects on the lattice

# One constraint!

The lattice has to be noetherian

# Noether...



# ...Emmy Noether





# Now the analysis itself



# Intraprocedural Analysis

- Pointer Analysis: Efficiency
- Shape Analysis: Precision
- Alias Set Analysis: Tradeoff between the two

# Data Structures



- push() and pop() on linked lists

**30% faster**

- Hash consing

**30% memory saving**


# Transfer Functions

ARITHMETIC INSTRUCTIONS	OPERATION
ADD $x_1, x_2, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $x_1 + x_2$
SUB $x_1, x_2, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $x_1 - x_2$
MUL $x_1, x_2, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $x_1 \cdot x_2$
DIV $x_1, x_2, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $\left\lfloor \frac{x_1}{x_2} \right\rfloor$
MOD $x_1, x_2, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $x_1 \bmod x_2$
BSH $x_1, x_2, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $\begin{cases} x_1 \cdot 2^{x_2} & \text{if } x_2 \geq 0 \\ \frac{x_1}{2^{-x_2}} & \text{if } x_2 < 0 \end{cases}$
BITWISE INSTRUCTIONS	OPERATION
AND $x_1, x_2, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $x_1 \& x_2$
OR $x_1, x_2, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $x_1   x_2$
XOR $x_1, x_2, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $x_1 \oplus x_2$
LOGICAL INSTRUCTIONS	OPERATION
BISZ $x_1, \epsilon, y$	$y$ is removed from all alias sets
JCC $x_1, \epsilon, y$	does not affect alias sets
DATA TRANSFER INSTRUCTIONS	OPERATION
LDM $x_1, \epsilon, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $\text{mem}[x_1]$
STM $x_1, \epsilon, y$	$\text{mem}[y]$ is added to the alias set of $x_1$
STR $x_1, \epsilon, y$	$y$ is added to the alias set of $x_1$
OTHER INSTRUCTIONS	OPERATION
NOP $\epsilon, \epsilon, \epsilon$	does not affect alias sets
UNDEF $\epsilon, \epsilon, y$	$y$ is removed from all alias sets
UNKN $\epsilon, \epsilon, \epsilon$	does not affect alias sets

# combine()

- Filter out non-live variables from each alias list:
  - $\text{live-out}(\text{inst}) \subseteq \text{vars}(\text{dom}(\text{inst}))$
  - Alias list  $\cap \text{vars}(\text{sdom}(\Phi))$ :
    - pop() from the list until  
 $\text{top(alias list)} \in \text{vars}(\text{sdom}(\Phi))$
- Add aliases defined by  $\Phi$  functions
- Unite the sets of lists

# Data Structures Again




# Example: intraprocedural analysis


```
| 001ED002    stm      ebp_0, , esp_2  
001ED100    str      esp_2, , ebp_1
```

```
| 001ED900    str      ebp_1, , esp_3
```

REIL in SSA Form



Points-to trees



Alias lists

# Data structures and C++ peculiarities


Heap Modeling and Aggregate Modeling:  
Too slow OR too imprecise

Identify constructors and destructors and  
consequent Size Tracking

+

Define access to abstract data structures

# Interprocedural Analysis




# Tracking parameters and return

- IDA effectively tracks parameters
- return is identified by guessing the calling convention



# Algorithm

- Flow-insensitive
- Context-sensitive
- Fixed point analysis:
  - walks on the PCG

# Procedure Call Graph




# Example: interprocedural analysis





Analysis result

PCG (detail)



# Example: interprocedural analysis




# Example: interprocedural analysis



# Example: interprocedural analysis




# Example: interprocedural analysis




# Detour...Graph Theory for Dummies




# A control flow graph




# Dominators



# Immediate dominator







# Dominator tree



# Bug Detection



# Callgraph pruning



# Algorithm

v: tracked alias

X: basic block of f() that calls the destructor


B: basic block of f() that accesses v or calls a function that accesses v

For every couple (X, B) in f(), check the following:

	<i>Bug</i>	<i>Warning</i>
<i>Stale pointer</i>	$B \in \text{dom}(X)$	$B \notin \text{dom}(X)$ $\wedge$ $B \in \text{succ}(X)$
<i>Memory leak</i>	$X \notin \text{dom}(B)$ $\wedge$ $X \notin \text{succ}(B)$	$X \notin \text{dom}(B)$ $\wedge$ $X \in \text{succ}(B)$


Iterate substituting f() with each of its callers

# Example: use after free bug




Dominator tree


$B \in \text{dom}(X)$




# Example: use after free bug




$B \in \text{dom}(X)$




# Example: use after free bug (warning)




$B \notin \text{dom}(X) \wedge B \in \text{succ}(X)$




# Example: use after free bug (warning)




$B \notin \text{dom}(X) \wedge B \in \text{succ}(X)$




# Example: no bugs




# Example: no bugs



# Example: use after free bug



# Example: use after free bug (warning)



# What's the catch

- We cannot handle all data structures
- We cannot handle function pointers
- We have false positives
- We have false negatives
- Some “smart pointers”-like interfaces might not be covered
- The best use is for C++ life-span issues

# Future

- Increase the number of covered data structure
- Use a solver to reduce false positives
- Import dynamic analysis data to mitigate the function pointers problem to reduce false negatives

# That's all folks

