



### 0x03 Attacks (1st part)

First attack made by Golic in 1997

\_\_ Linear equations system : complexity → 2^40.16

1999, M.Briceno attacks A5/1 using reverse engineering and publishes his source code.


2000, Alex Biryukov, Adi Shamir and David Wagner make a demonstration about A5/1 real-time cryptanalysis


Memory/time compromise, complexity → 2<sup>48</sup> (with 300G of precomputed data)

The same year, Eli Biham and Orr Dunkelman publish an attack with a complexity of 2^39.91 requiring to have 2^20.8 bits of unencrypted data, 32Gio of data must be precomputed.

2003, Ekdahl and Johannson fine an attack on A5/1 initialization, allowing the crack in a few seconds. The condition is to have 5min of unencrypted communication.

2004, Maximov and its team improve the attack with 1min of precomputing and a few seconds of unencrypted data.





# 0x04 Cracking with GPGPU computing 0x041 Which attacks are the best? 1997, Gollic publishes an attack on the key, complexity: 2^40.16 about 1 254 282 970 142 operations 2000, Alex Biryukov, Adi Shamir and David Wagner demonstrate a real-time cryptanalysis of 15/1, complexit: 2^48 562 949 953 421 312 operations needs 300Go of precomputed datas Still 2000, Eli Biham and Orr Dunkelman publish an attack with a 2^39.91 complexity requiring 2<sup>2</sup>0.8 bits of unencrypted data, 32 Go of data must be precomputed. 1 825 676.85 operations

## 0x04 Cracking with GPGPU computing 0x041 Which attacks are the best?

2003, Ekdahl and Johannson find an attack on A5/1 initialization, which permits cracking in a few minutes but requires 5min of unencrypted data

\_\_ having 5min of unencrypted data is hardly reachable. Typically a lab case.

2004, Maximov and its team improve this attack with 1min of computing and a few seconds of unencrypted data.

\_\_ no documentation available ==> no study possible :s

En 2009, Kartsen Nohl begins his rainbow tables precomputation project.

his work demonstrates that the full code book is not possible on a single computer (complexity: 2^58) ==> 128 Petabytes. Total computing time would take more than 100 000 years.

## 0x04 Cracking with GPGPU computing 0x041 Which attacks are the best?

Precomputing the whole code book on a GPU cluster

\_ precomputation time == > 6 to 7 months, depending on the cards and computers amount.

Pros: cheaper

Cons: needs a lot of computers

The most appropriate technology is the FPGA:

Example: Precomputing on 68 PICO e16 cards => 3 months

\_\_Still depending on the processors amount, but the 68 cards can be shipped in a single machine.

Cons: expensive

# 0x05 Conclusion

Regarding the hardware requirements for GSM transmissions and computing power, we are far from being able to listen our neighboors phone calls. But the continuous technology improvements should allow individuals to perform this attack soon.

20 years ago, the required hardware for the GSM layer was very expensive, about 50 000€, and was'n very easy to use.

Today, this hardware can be bought for 2000 to 3000€, it's usage becomes much easier on many points.

