

final word on language and nutrition


The Japanese eat very little fat and suffer fewer heart attacks than the British or Americans.

The French eat a lot of fat and also suffer fewer heart attacks than the British or Americans.

The Swedish drink very little red wine and suffer fewer heart attacks than the British or Americans. The Italians drink excessive amounts of red wine and also suffer fewer heart attacks than the British or Americans.

CONCLUSION: Eat and drink what you like. Speaking English is apparently what kills you.

Cyber Threat Profile



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Be prepared!

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR THE MINET I thought you were bringing the ANTI-TERRIGARE paint.

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A Question of definition

An incident is any event that deviates from the standard and expected operation of a system or service

Standard - who defines the standard?

Expected operation - I had expected Microsoft Fatal Error!

An incident is the act of violating an explicit or implied security policy.

Security policy – what's that? My system can't be violated because I have no policy!

An incident occurs, if IT security is impaired/jeopardized by an IT security gap or a breach of IT security.

What is with the loss of credit or reputation? What is with a breach of duty or infringements?

A Definition with questions

What can be happen? What is the risk for my division or company? How can I minimize the risks? If IT-Security, Personnel Data Protection, Security Service, Disaster Recovery ... doesn't work – what's than? How can I react if my company is impaired or jeopardized?


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What is an incident?


Incident Categorization

- Increased access
- Disclosure of information
- Corruption of information
- Denial of service
- Theft of resources

Increased access



Disclosure of information







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
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





Disclosure of information



Corruption of information



Denial of service



Denial of service - Disaster



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








Denial of service

BRINGING CIVILIZATION TO ITS KNEES...









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
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Theft of resources



Case Example – Web-Defacement



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TUS!

IMT - Incident Management Team



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"Wake up call" - Identification



Immediate Response - Bw

- Step 1.1 Carry out Initial Analysis and Start Documentation
- Step 1.2 Preserve the Scene Screening
- Step 1.3 Contact IT specialist personnel
- Step 1.4 Preserve the Evidence
- Step 1.5 Determine the Extent and Perform a Risk Analysis
- Report to the Management

Step 1.0 Document everything

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
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Questions

- Who has carried out the action?
 (Suspects, administrator, disciplinary superior, IT security officer, superior agency, service provider, legal adviser)
- What action was carried out?
 (e.g. report, backup, audit, interrogation)

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- Where was the action carried out? (e.g. search of official room building 16, data backup in the server room building 73, readout of log files in the IT security officer's official room, photos in room 166, etc.)
- How and with what means was the action carried out? (data backup on CD, preserving evidence with digital camera, analysis of computer with the forensic tool "Encase", etc.)

Step 1.0 Document everything

Capture everything that occurs in detail:

- names
- times
- events as they actually occurred
- Date-Time-Group (DTG)
- action

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- List of all computer systems, devices and applications affected by the investigation
- Hard-/Software information
- Remarks (incl. reference to documentation)

Log Book (example)

LOV:				
b0:	Serial	DTG	Action	Remarks
d0:	No.			
e0:	1	23 Feb 08	Sys admin Mr.Smith reports IT security	
f0: 00:		09.45	violation	
10:	2	23 Feb 08	Checking of the user account by IT security	Image copied and
ŧ		10.25	officer from Admin workstation 03 (R.105)	saved on CD.
	3	23 Feb 08	Report to management. Order to initiate	
:03		10.45	investigation	
T.	4	23 Feb 08	Checking of Client 1074, network address	
74		11.45	123.123.145.23 in room 143	
_ (5	23 Feb 08	Securing data at Admin Mr.Newman.	Storage in room 143
10c 115		12.13	Seizure of data carriers.	
1	6	23 Feb 08	Locking of user account by sys admin Mr.	
he		12.55	Hubble.	
he	7	23 Feb 08	Consulting hotline at CERT XY about	
		14.05	further action	
566	8	24 Feb 08	Interrogation of suspect by CIO Mr.Jones	Record of
1)/		09.05		interrogation held
000				by Personnal
na i				Officer
34	9	24 Feb 08	IT security violation report filed with IT	Enclosure 12
n/		10.50	security officer of the organization area	
\x				

Step 1.0 Document everything



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Step 1.1 Initial analysis

Detection – First Reaktion – Action

"Need to know princip" "Undercover investigation"

Immidiate Reaktion

Motto from the Signal Corps "Thinking – pushing – speaking"

Step 1.2 Preserve the scene-screening

- closing off the scene to prevent access of unauthorized personnel
- identifying the staff working/employed in the office
- preventing the perpetrator or perpetrators from further accessing the IT systems of the agency
- In addition, photographs should be taken of rooms, IT configurations and evidence, before making any changes to the scene.

Stop the "Experts"



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Step 1.3 Notify appropriate personnel

Internal

- CIO
- Administrators (Network & Security)
- Security officer
- Security analyst/ Forensic specialist
- Auditor

External

- Industrial CERT
- Law Enforcement
- Forensic specialist
- Recovery specialist

Additional

- Legal Advicer
- Public Relations

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
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Step 1.3 Notify appropriate personnel



- available
- silent
- trained
- decisive
- knowledgeable
- assertive

Assistant Technical Incident Officer •

Built up IRC Incident Response Capability

Step 1.4 Preserve the evidence

Ensure the integrity and availability of the evidence!

- Destruction
- Theft
- Changes
- Loss of data
- Tainting the evidence

Done by suspects, attacker

AND

own "IT-experts"

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Stop the "Experts"



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Step 1.5 Determine the extent

- Which and how many systems and data are actually or likely affected?
- Are there internal or external activity?
- Are other computer affected?
- Are IT security systems affected?
- Is the threat likely to spread?
- Are IT systems of external parties affected?
- Is the incident occurred or ceased?

The risk assessment/initial risk analysis may result in additional measures to maintain IT security.

Step 1.5 Verify the Incident

Results of Verification:

- verified and proceed
- undetermined and proceed
- refuted and terminate



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Reporting

A report should include the following information:

- Incident designation;
- activity designation;
- point of contact/telephone number;
- an account of the facts (e.g. a description of IT equipment/software/project);
- damage established;
- measures taken.

Document everything



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Step 2.1 Implementation of immediate measures to safeguard IT Security


- Installation of patches or updates
- Setting of filters in Firewall/Proxy systems
- Performance of workarounds
- Closure of ports
- Deactivation of user accounts, applications or other software
- Shutdown of clients
- Shutdown of domains
- Closure/blocking of Firewall

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Step 2.1 Implementation of immediate measures to safeguard IT Security



Step 2.2 Collecting evidence



Step 2.3 Analysis evidence



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Forensic guidelines / principles

- 1. No action should change data
 - Write protection, sterile media, Bit stream copy
 - first incident response
- 2. People dealing with evidence should be competent
- 3. A complete audit trail / documentation is necessary
 - Photo, video, printouts, log book
- 4. Identification / verifycation (Hash)
- 5. A forensic officer should not be part of a investigation unit


Forensic equipment and principles

- Portable equipment
 - Forensic workstation, write protection, video, camera,
 - software tools (Encase, Ilook, FTK, Linux, Smart, ...)
- Laboratory
 - All kind of standard machines, password/decryption clusters
 - Different networks, storage capacity
 - software tools (Encase, Ilook, FTK, Linux, Smart, ...)
- Communication plattforms
 - Local
 - European High Tech Crime Web EVPN

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Image production

Writeblocker with Firewire-Interface connected to the Storage PC



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Step 2.3 Analysis evidence

ILook IXimager A forensic data imaging system





Developed by the U.S. Treasury Department IRS Criminal Investigation Electronic Crimes Program in conjunction with other U.S. Federal Agencies

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ILook IXimager, RELEASE: v1.0 Aug 25 2004

F2 for help

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Analysis of internet use!

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
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IT forensic training

- Constant need
 - − 1/3 of working time
 - Minimum of 30 days per year
- budgets
- Very few special forensic trainings
 - International, expensive
- Lack of national / international cooperation

Step 2.4 Evaluation

The evaluation of the technical analysis should be confined to the description of the technically comprehensible events.

The technical evidence shall be verified, as far as possible, by interrogations.

Step 2.5 Archiving evidence

All evidence should be securely archived and stored

- Original evidence
- Back-up copy
- Reports
- Supporting documents
- Log-Book

Step 3.1 Additional troubleshooting options

- deletion of infected files/directories
- reconfigurations
- updates
- installing images
- restart of IT systems.
- reconfiguring firewall rules
- installing hotfixes

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Step 3.2 Additional recovery options

When information/data were destroyed or manipulated due to an incident, measures must be taken to recover these information/data. In this case, measures in accordance with the agency's data protection concept must be taken in cooperation with the administrator (e.g. backups/recovery).

Incident Management Pocket Card

- 1. This pocket card is not a replacement of the Incident Management Guide.
- 2. Stay calm! Take appropriate actions. Check the accountability of the report, verify the facts. If you don't know what to do, ask an expert.
- 3. When personnel-related data are affected, consult the data protection commissioner of the agency.
- 4. Document everything! Take pictures, if possible.
- 5. Consider all unknown activities to be harmful. If the computer runs processes that are unknown to you, switch it off! (emergency switch-off) Do not perform a regular shutdown on a computer with a suspicious IT security incident!

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Incident Management Pocket Card

- 6. When you notice download or upload activities, pull the power plug or interrupt the modem connection.7. Prohibit unauthorized actions! IT or technical staff of other
- areas required for support only acts **as directed.**Administrators are **no** investigators, they support you in the preservation of evidence.
 - 8. Ask all persons you do not need for the preservation of evidence to leave the affected rooms.
 - 9. Prevent the suspected person from gaining further access to the IT systems!
 - 10. Never accept help from the suspect! Ask for the passwords and do not let the perpetrator, for example, perform the logon process him or herself!

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11. If anything fails, pull the plug!

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Thank you for your attention!

