

Femtocell: Femtostep to the Holy Grail

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
TROOPERS 2011, 30 March 2011



mobile telecommunication history


- 0G - 1950 : not so handy
- 1G - 1980 : similar to 2G, but with analog voice (like in PSTN)
- 2G - 1991 : GSM in Europe, CDMA in the USA. Very successful, ... and now broken
- 2.5G : GPRS. Packet Switching capability
- 3G - 2002 : UMTS in Europe, CDMA 2000 in the USA. Usable mobile Internet
- 3.5G : HSDPA, faster download. 3.75G : HSUPA, faster upload.
3.9G : LTE/WiMAX
- 4G : LTE-Advanced, WiMAX 2 : Higher bandwidth, no Circuit Switching

UMTS architecture (simplified)




UMTS architecture (complex)

Structure of an UMTS network



cells



What is a femtocell :

- it's an access point (sometimes called FAP)
- it connects the mobile phone to the 3G/UMTS network
- compatible with every UMTS capable mobile phone
- small cells, with a coverage of less than 20m
- low power device
- easy to install, you only have provide power and Internet access
- technical name : Home Node B (HNB)

user advantages

advantages provided to the users :

- can be installed at home to provide coverage (if not available)
- provides high bandwidth (not shared with the public)
- can provide location based services (kids arrived at home)

but nothing Wifi can not provide for free, except you don't have to configure the phone.


operator advantages

advantages for the operator :


- extended coverage, near to the users
- traffic offloads from their public infrastructure
- cheap hardware, that the user even has to buy
- no installation cost
- no maintenance cost
- new revenue possibilities
- IP connectivity

conclusion : femtocells are a great opportunity for the operators.

HNB in UMTS network



HNB Subsystem



How to get a femtocell:

- choose a country from the 12 which deploy them
- get an address and IP from this country, because usage is only allowed within the country
- select an operator from the 18 which offer them
- get a mobile phone subscription from this operator, required to get the femtocell service
- gently ask for a femtocell
- get it for free, one time payment, or monthly fee
- enjoy 😊

Location verification


operators have to verify where the femtocell is, for several reasons:

- prevent you to avoid roaming costs in foreign countries
- UMTS uses the 2.1 GHz freq. band, a licensed spectrum band. The operators own the radio licenses for the femtocell only for their country
- location of the users is required for lawful interception


techniques

How to find where the femtocell is located:

- IP : geoIP, even knowing the ISP is enough
- GNSS : GPS
- macrocell : cells beacon county, network, and location information (MCC, MNC, LAC)




attacks





under the hood



network testing

first approach :

- sniffing
only DHCP, and NTP. Then everything goes over IPsec
- probing ports (nmap)
only port 80 is open
linux has been detected, but the source code is not public
- web interface available
protected access, no documentation, even the customer service was unaware
- serial port found on PCB
login prompt not enabled

First impression : the device is secure. ☹

But the first impression is not the last impression. 😊


recovery mode and purpose

critical point : the recovery procedure
remember :

- keep femtocells cheap
- no maintenance cost
- no local support

So if something does not work right, do a factory reset. For that, the recovery procedure has been created.

process overview




flaws and exploits ①

flaws :

- recovery image is downloaded over HTTP
- credentials are in plain text
- normally the image is encrypted, but modified URL will return unencrypted version
- image is still signed. it can't be altered, but viewed

exploit : the recovery process can be analyzed




flaws and exploits ③

flaws :

- integrity of parameter and image list relies only on HTTPS
- file is not signed
- HTTPS uses authentication, but not mutual

exploit : you can provide your own lists




flaws and exploits ⑤

flaws :

- real name of the files are in the image list
- encryption keys are in the image list

exploit : you can get an decrypt the images



reconfigure

the parameter list contains some interesting values :

- the login prompt for the serial port can be enabled
- the root password is the same then in the recovery image, stored in md5
- the public key used to verify the signatures is in there
- it's possible to clone femtocells (except the SIM)

[General]

```
pcbId=P04S...  
imei=357539...  
mac=00:1B:67:...  
hwflag=2  
serial=P04S...
```


[BootSigning]

```
pubkey=EE:17:C5:F2:...
```

reflash

you can provide your own image list :

- the URLs, encryption keys and signatures are in there
- you can provide your own images
- you can use the previously obtained images, and modify them
- now it's possible to install anything



web interface

found while analyzing the images :

- credentials for web interface are in a local database
- the previously discovered interface is provided by the operator. it only contains the status and subscriber list
- a hidden web interface is provided by the vendor. it contains the complete configuration
- the hidden web pages can be accessed without authentication

The screenshot shows a web interface with a navigation bar at the top containing buttons for 'logout', 'status', 'metrics', 'diagnostics', 'network', and 'engineering'. Below this is a secondary row of buttons: 'zap status', 'ue status', 'add ue', 'software status', and 'event log'. The 'zap status' button is selected, leading to a page with the following information:

Zap Status	ZAP Status:	OK
	Current Temperature (°C):	29
	Up Time:	0 days, 0 hours, 1 mins, 0 secs
	First Use Date:	Thu Feb 10 14:39:37 2011
	Current Local Time:	Thu Feb 17 07:25:25 2011
	Local Time Zone Name:	Europe/London

HNS services

use the femtocell to explore behind the security gateway :

- Performance Measurement server : stores the femtocell activity
- OAM server : used to update the femtocell
- HMS server : used to configure and provision the femtocell

Reconfiguration

you can change the femtocell settings :

- disable macrocell sniffing
- add phone to the subscriber list
- provide own security gateway
- change cell configuration


The screenshot shows a web interface for adding a user equipment (UE). At the top, there are four tabs: 'zap status', 'ue status', 'add ue' (which is highlighted in red), and 'software status'. Below the tabs, there are three input fields: 'IMSI' (empty), 'MSISDN' (empty), and 'Handout Enabled' (set to 'false'). At the bottom of the form, there are two buttons: 'submit' and 'reset'.

The screenshot shows a configuration page with several settings, each with a dropdown menu:

- Enable 2G Sniff: true
- Configured Bands: GSM900 + 1800
- OPLMN Search Enable: true
- GSM Neighbour List Type: Reselection & Han

significance of the attacks

- privacy threats - recording phone calls, SMS..



significance of the attacks

- eavesdropping
- accessing infrastructural elements

```

GSM SMS TPOU (GSM 03,40) SMS-DELIVER
0... .. = TP-RP: TP Reply Path parameter is not set in this SMS SUBMIT/DELI
.0... .. = TP-UDHI: The TP UD field contains only the short message
..1... .. = TP-SRI: A status report shall be returned to the SME
.... .1.. = TP-MMS: No more messages are waiting for the MS in this SC
.... .00 = TP-MTI: SMS-DELIVER (0)
▶ TP-Originating-Address - (000000000000)
▶ TP-PID: 0
▶ TP-DCS: 0
▶ TP-Service-Centre-Time-Stamp
TP-User-Data-Length: (21) depends on Data-Coding-Scheme
▼ TP-User-Data
Test continues Stella
  
```

plain text SMS message

threat list

Attacks, effects, and impact are documented in the 3GPP femtocell standard (TR 33.820)

group	threat	impact
Compromise of HNB Credentials	Compromise of HNB authentication token by local physical intrusion	Harmful
Physical attacks on a HNB	Booting HNB with fraudulent software ("re-flashing")	up to disastrous
Configuration attacks on a HNB	Fraudulent software update / configuration changes	Extremely harmful
	Mis-configuration of HNB	Irritating to harmful
Protocol attacks on a HNB	Mis-configuration of access control list (ACL) or compromise of the access control list	Irritating to harmful
	Man-in-the-middle attacks on HNB first network access	Very Harmful
	Compromise of an HNB by exploiting weaknesses of active network services	Extremely harmful
Attacks on the core network, including HNB location-based attacks	Manipulation of external time source	Harmful
	Threat of HNB network access	Harmful
	Changing of the HNB location without reporting	Harmful
User Data and identity privacy attacks	Misconfiguration of the firewall in the modem/router	Annoying
	HNB announcing incorrect location to the network	Harmful
	User's network ID revealed to Home (e)NodeB owner	Breaking users privacy

It also includes recommendations and countermeasures

conclusion and opening

- femtocells is an effective technology in terms of offloading the traffic and of new business cases
- but... the operators need to do their homework
- follow the specifications, secure the device and network access
- some serious threats (ongoing work):
 - re-use the telecom infrastructure elements
 - build a MitM, to be used during communications

Thanks

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questions

Danke

Questions ?

