

# Security Reflections on Multifunction Devices



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
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## Agenda

- Motivation
- Multifunction Devices (MFD)
- Role of MFDs in Corporate Networks
- Threats and Vulnerabilities
- *Sisters' Act* of MFD Security
- Conclusions

## Why MFD Security?

Because it's a well known threat



Black Hat Europe 2006  
Jack

Black Hat USA 2010  
Bojinov



Black Hat USA 2010  
Heffner

Black Hat Europe 2010  
Mende, Rey

## Motivation

Printer compromise?

→ Why not?



## Motivation

Different understanding of MFDs


- *Aggregator of sensitive information*
- Multiple attack vectors exist

## Definition of MFDs



- Quoting *SANS* (2007):
- *“In today’s all-in-one world, you can now obtain single devices that are not only printers, but also*
  - *copiers,*
  - *scanners,*
  - *and fax machines.*
- *These networked multifunction devices (MFDs) are increasingly common in enterprise environments [...].”*

## Their components



- Printing unit
- Image scanner
- Modem for fax communication
- Network interface
- Processor & RAM
- Flash drive (often used for OS)
- Harddrive

## Protocols

... and there are a lot!

- └ SMB
  - └ PJP/PCL/PS/GS
  - └ SNMP
  - └ FTP
  - └ HTTP
  - └ SMTP
  - └ POP3
  - └ Telnet
  - └ ...
- } Attack vectors!



## Typical implementation



- Enterprise level networks
- Small and medium corporate networks
- Access control?
  - Use of MFDs is a critical business use case!
- Dedicated devices for higher management?
  - Some people claim to have seen this, but...

## Threats



- When talking about security, it is always important to approach certain assets in a structured way.

## Threats

My brother dropped my printer.

- Device compromise
- Physical access
- Information disclosure
- Abuse in context of social engineering attacks
- Eavesdropping

## Vulnerabilities

- Programming flaws
- Lack of hardening
- No encryption
- Insecure file deletion
- Design errors
- Insufficient filtering

## Warstories



- 2002:
  - Design errors
  - Code execution in embedded Java VM
- You responded, right? ;-)
  - Again...

## The Evergreen

### Web Vulnerabilities

- XSS, SQLi, Authentication Bypass
  - We don't have to tell, do we?
- **Impact:**
  - Arbitrary file download
  - Rogue firmware upload
  - IP filter manipulation
  - ...

## Evergreens...

cntd

- SNMP
- Spam Relay
- Default SSL certs
- PostScript exploits
- Phone Home features

## Underdogs



– PjL

– Actually, this is *really* lame

– @PjL RDYMSG DISPLAY = “INSERT COIN”



## Underdogs



– PjL

– But might be used in social engineering context

– @PjL RDYMSG DISPLAY = “ERROR! Call 555-111”

## PJL Cheat Sheet

### Short digression

- @PJL ECHO "PJL TEST"
  - *@PJL ECHO "PJL TEST"*
- @PJL FSDIRLIST NAME="0:\\" entry=1 count=255
  - ...
  - *spool\_files*
  - ...
- @PJL FSDIRLIST NAME="0:\spool\_files\" entry=1 count=255
  - 0001.jpg
  - 0002.jpg
  - ....
- @PJL FSDOWNLOAD FORMAT: BINARY SIZE=4096 NAME = "0:\spool\_files\001.jpg"

# Recent results?

Time for an own lab...



## FTP Download

```
Connected to 10.66.66.10.
220 FTP print service:V-1.10/Use the network password for the ID if updating.
Name (10.66.66.10:uchimata):
230 User uchimata logged in.
Remote system type is ITRON.
ftp> ls
200 Ready command OK.
150 Transfer Start
total 26931500
-r--r--r--  1 root  printer 26931500 Mar  1 1993 c7200-g8ik9s-mz.124-2.XB10.bin
dr--r--r--  1 root  printer    0 Jan  2 03:44 BROTHER
226 Data Transfer OK.
```

## FTP Download

```
ftp> cd BROTHER
250 CWD command successful
ftp> ls
200 Ready command OK.
150 Transfer Start
total      53829
dr--r--r--  1 root    printer    0 Jan  2 03:44 .
dr--r--r--  1 root    printer    0 Jan  2 03:44 ..
-r--r--r--  1 root    printer   53829 Jan  2 03:50 02010301.TIF
226 Data Transfer OK.
```

## FTP Download

```
ftp> binary
200 Ready command OK.
ftp> get 02010301.TIF
local: 02010301.TIF remote: 02010301.TIF
200 Ready command OK.
150 Transfer Start
226 Data Transfer OK.
53829 bytes received in 1.14 secs (46.1 kB/s)
```

## Arbitrary crashes


We didn't even try to fuzz...



- Crash
- Reboot
- Undefined behavior

# XSS

Just because it's so mandatory ;-)





## Forensic

- Hard drive disassembly
  - And it's so easy...
- Recovery of documents
  - Even easier? ;-)

## Disassembly



## Disassembly

This was even a hard one




## Reconstructing

```
0a 25 c7 ec 8f a2 0a 35 |%PDF-1.4.%.....5|
3c 2f 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 | 0 obj.<</Length|
69 6c 74 65 72 20 2f 46 | 6 0 R/Filter /F|
64 65 3e 3e 0a 73 74 72 |lateDecode>>.str|
d9 92 1c c5 15 f5 f3 58 |eam.x...\.....X|
be 84 1d 0e b3 19 64 43 |...S.....dC|

49 46 00 01 01 00 00 01 |.....JFIF.....|
43 52 45 41 54 4f 52 3a |.....<CREATOR:|
20 76 31 2e 30 20 28 75 | gd-jpeg v1.0 (u|
20 4a 50 45 47 20 76 36 |sing IJG JPEG v6|
69 74 79 20 3d 20 31 30 |2), quality = 10|
```

- Punchline:  
Files are recoverable, even though they're not visible at first glance
  - Still surprising? Srsly? ;-)
- Not only talking about scanned documents
- There is a reason for large hdds...

## Reconstructing



## Reconstruction

cntd

- How about leased MFDs?
  - Or refurbished hard drives/MFDs sold?

Sie waren der Höchstbietende bei dieser Auktion. |



### HP 4500 4550 Laserjet Netzwerkkarte 610N & Festplatte

Artikelzustand: **Gebraucht**

Beendet: 02. Mär. 2011 23:45:29 MEZ

Erfolgreiches  
Gebot: **EUR 30,00** [ 1 Gebot ]

Auf die Liste ▾

World hasn't change

- At least, regarding printer vulnerabilities
- So, what now?

## Seven Sisters





## Seven Sisters



Access Control



Secure Management



Hardening



Isolation



Encryption



Restriction



Visibility

## Access Control



- Secure Passwords
- Don't forget community strings!

## Isolation



- Dedicated MFD/printer/fax VLAN?

## Restriction



- Filter traffic to printer VLAN
- Decide which printing protocol is needed!

## Encryption



- Hdd encryption
  - ATA password
- Transport encryption

## Hardening



- Disable protocols
- Replace default passwords
- Enable disk wiping/secure delete

## Hardening

cntd

- Patch management?
  - CVE-2010-0548
  - CVE-2010-0549
  - CVE-2010-2063
- Web interface access necessary?
  - If not: disable it or use mgmt vlan!

## Hardening

cntd

- Disable PXE boot
- Enable deletion of spool files



## Secure Management



- HTTPS
- Mgmt VLAN
- LDAP user authentication

## Visibility



- Print job logging
- LDAP/AD integration

## Why isn't it happening?


- Hardening guides exist
  - Even from the manufacturers!
- Align your processes!
- Also think about maintenance access
- Where to store scanned files?

## Conclusions

- Most scary: This isn't really new
- Missing awareness
- Think about MFDs as *aggregators of sensitive information*
  - ... in your own environment!

Thank you!

Questions?



## References

- [http://www.konicaminolta.co.uk/fileadmin/CONTENT\\_local/Business\\_Solutions/Press-Office/White-Papers/Fundamentals-of-Security.pdf](http://www.konicaminolta.co.uk/fileadmin/CONTENT_local/Business_Solutions/Press-Office/White-Papers/Fundamentals-of-Security.pdf)
- [http://www.hp.com/united-states/business/catalog/nist\\_checklist.pdf](http://www.hp.com/united-states/business/catalog/nist_checklist.pdf)