

SAP GUI Hacking (V1.0)

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Who am I



Andreas Wiegenstein

- CTO and founder of Virtual Forge, responsible for R&D
- SAP Security Researcher, active since 2003
- Speaker at SAP TechEd 2004, 2005, 2006, DSAG 2009, BlackHat 2011
- Co-Author of "Secure ABAP Programming" (SAP Press)

Virtual Forge GmbH

- SAP security product company based in Heidelberg, Germany
- Focus on (ABAP) application security services
 - ABAP Security Scanner
 - ABAP Security Guidelines
 - ABAP Security Trainings
 - SAP Security Consulting

Belief: "Our SAP system is secure."



- Roles & Authorizations
- Segregation of Duties
- Secure Configuration & System / Service Hardening
- Encryption
- Secure Network Infrastructure
- Password Policies
- Patch Management
- Identity Management
- Single Sign-on







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1. ABAP, the SAP GUI and everything



Advanced Business Application Programming



- Proprietary language, exact specification not (freely) available
- Platform-independent code
- Client separation built-in
- Integrated auditing capabilities
- System-to-System calls via SAP Remote Function Call (RFC)
- Client-Server communication via SAP GUI (DIAG protocol)
- Various programming paradigms:
 - Programs & Forms, Reports, Function Modules, Dynpros
 - Classes & Methods, Business Server Pages, Web Dynpro ABAP
- Integrated platform-independent SQL Standard: Open SQL
- Built-in authentication, roles and (explicit) authorization model
- Thousands of well-known standard programs and database tables
- 150+ Million Lines of Code in an ECC6.0 System

SAP GUI



- Proprietary fat client, provided and maintained by SAP
- Available as Windows executable and Java application
- Client-Server Communication via DIAG protocol
- DIAG can be encrypted with SNC, but is only compressed by default
- Renders ABAP Dynpros and is the default SAP user interface
- Provides methods to interchange files with the SAP application server
- Execution of screen-events can be scripted



2. SAP GUI Attacks originating from the Server

ABAP Functions that access the SAP GUI client



- Function Module WS EXECUTE
 - Executes an operating system command on the client
- Function Module GUI_UPLOAD
 - Uploads a file from the Client to the Server
- Function Module GUI DOWNLOAD
 - Downloads a file from the Server to the Client
- Class CL GUI FRONTEND_SERVICES
 - Provides various other functions
 - Directory listing, access to clipboard, etc
- Underlying ABAP Commands
 - CALL METHOD OF
 - CALL cfunc



DEMO

Mitigation(s)



- Install SAP GUI 7.20
 - Restrict access to client-side ressources
- New security center in SAP GUI for Windows 7.20
 (https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1483525)
- More on SAP GUI Security
 - "Secure Configuration SAP Netweaver Application Server ABAP"
 - https://service.sap.com/~sapidb/011000358700000968282010E.pdf



3. SAP GUI Attacks originating from the Client

Client-side Manipulations



- Forceful Browsing in SAP GUI!
 - Manipulate disabled fields and buttons
- Cross-Site Scripting in SAP GUI applications !!!
 - Not nice, but rare
- SAP GUI scripting
 - Scripting of SAP GUI events



DEMO

Mitigation(s)




- Do not transport important data by client-roundtrips
- Make sure you use HTMLViewer Control (CL_DD_DOCUMENT) securely
- Disable SAP GUI scripting
 - See "SAP GUI Scripting Security Guide"
 - http://www.sdn.sap.com/irj/scn/index?rid=/library/uuid/3099a575-9cf4-2a10-9492-9838706b9262



4. SAP GUI Attacks originating from the Internet



- Cross-Application Request Forgery with SAP Shortcuts
 - Allows malicious Web sites to fire SAP GUI events





DEMO

Mitigation(s)



- Read SAP Security Notes 1397000 & 1526048
 - (https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1397000)
 - (https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1526048)

SAP / ABAP Security Information



Organizations



BIZEC – Business Security Initiative http://www.bizec.org

Literature



"Secure ABAP-Programming" (German only) SAP Press 2009

If you find new zero days

secure@sap.com



Questions?

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