

# Combating Hybrids

*and The Modern Threatscape*

---

**Derek Manky**

**Project Manager, Cyber Security & Threat Research**

**YSTS 3.0: June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2009**

# Presentation Overview

- Modern Threats & Hybrids Intro
- Current Threat Profiles
  - Waledac
  - Conficker
- Virut: A Modern Hybrid
  - Prevalence & Impact
  - Live Demonstration
- Combating Modern Threats
- Q&A

# Modern Threats & Hybrids Intro


## Modern Threats

- Targeted Attacks: Documents Favored
  - Various Exploits Used
    - PDF, XLS, DOC
    - Soon: Migration to social networks, blogs
      - Profiling
  - Common Malware Dropped
- Social Engineering 2.0
  - Location Based Services / geoIP
    - Waledac, Canadian Pharmacy
  - Profiling
  - Ransomware
- Obfuscated Scripting
- Packers++

# Modern Threats & Hybrids Intro


## Modern Threats

- Targeted Attacks: Documents Favored



# Modern Threats & Hybrids Intro

- 3 Quarter Increase in Received Samples



# Current Threat Profiles

## Waledac

- Malware Profile
- Routine Campaigns (5+ in 2009)
  - Botnet
    - Similar to Storm Worm
    - End Point / Server Nodes
    - HTTP Communication
      - Encrypted
      - Dynamic Session Keys
    - Initial Seed List in Binary
      - Node Updates Sent
  - Mass Mailer
    - Malicious Links
    - Affiliate Spam
      - Canadian Pharmacy



The screenshot shows the Obama-Biden campaign website. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links for 'LEARN', 'ISSUES', 'MEDIA', 'ACTION', 'PEOPLE', 'STATES', 'BLOG', and 'STORE'. Below the navigation bar, there is a section titled 'OBAMA BLOG' with three blog posts. The first post is titled 'Barack Obama has refused to be a president' and is dated January 20, 2009. The second post is titled 'President-Elect Obama at the Lincoln Memorial: "You made this belief real"' and is dated January 18, 2009. The third post is titled 'Watch the "We Are One" Inaugural Celebration on HBO' and is dated January 18, 2009. To the right of the blog posts, there is a video player for 'BARACK TV' showing a video titled 'Signs of Hope & Change: Election Night'. Below the video player, there is a section for 'MY.BARACKOBAMA.COM' with a 'LOGIN TO MyBO' button.



Get Your Free 30-Day Trial!



Do you want to test your partner or just to read somebody's SMS? This program is exactly what you need then! It's so easy! You don't need to install it at the mobile phone of your partner. Just download the program and you will be able to read all SMS when you are online. Be aware of everything! This is an extremely new service!

[Download Free Trial](#)

© SMS Spy. All rights reserved

# Current Threat Profiles

## Waledac

- **Fast Flux Botnet**
  - Small TTL
  - Choice Weapon
    - Anonymous
  - Widely Adopted
  - Thousands of Domains
  - Various Campaigns
  - P2P

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
.com.      300      IN       A       58.226.111.
.com.      300      IN       A       59.10.217.
.com.      300      IN       A       59.17.208.
.com.      300      IN       A       75.73.80.
.com.      300      IN       A       76.192.155.
.com.      300      IN       A       79.120.29.
.com.      300      IN       A       121.133.39.
.com.      300      IN       A       123.240.138.
.com.      300      IN       A       210.122.176.
.com.      300      IN       A       211.223.119.
.com.      300      IN       A       211.244.142.
.com.      300      IN       A       218.190.166.
.com.      300      IN       A       221.126.134.
.com.      300      IN       A       222.238.99.
.com.      300      IN       A       58.85.219.
```

... 445 Seconds Pass ...

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
.com.      155      IN       A       58.226.111.
.com.      155      IN       A       59.17.208.
.com.      155      IN       A       ● 61.47.221.
.com.      155      IN       A       79.120.29.
.com.      155      IN       A       ● 89.178.12.
.com.      155      IN       A       ● 89.178.52.
.com.      155      IN       A       121.133.39.
.com.      155      IN       A       ● 123.98.189.
.com.      155      IN       A       210.122.176.
.com.      155      IN       A       ● 211.112.112.
.com.      155      IN       A       211.223.119.
.com.      155      IN       A       211.244.142.
.com.      155      IN       A       218.190.166.
.com.      155      IN       A       221.126.134.
.com.      155      IN       A       222.238.99.
```

# Current Threat Profiles

## Waledac

- Server Side Polymorphism
  - One Domain: 10 Days
    - One Malicious File
    - 275+ Variations
  - One Domain: 50 Days
    - One Malicious File
    - 1440+ Variations
  - < 1 Hour Changes
    - Consistent For ~2 Months

```
2009-03-31 18:34:44: Fetched file 62aa7a98c83170b76c36367ad1b109d4
2009-03-31 20:57:40: Fetched file 230f330b0c95f2ae4a8c6bd3e3edabc1
2009-03-31 21:09:27: Fetched file e3d2c391e6e7b7dff2ad72396ecccc7ff
2009-03-31 21:33:10: Fetched file 9e671afc49040031fd5c3ab9dfbe2267
2009-03-31 21:35:25: Fetched file 9e671afc49040031fd5c3ab9dfbe2267
2009-03-31 22:07:48: Fetched file 1355b7bf1be0a1e985d5d121d025abd5f
2009-03-31 22:59:25: Fetched file 1b6a864b3cfab512c2d2ad0f508b84e5
2009-04-01 00:26:33: Fetched file bce5934c453edd17507f308bcf27f7d3
2009-04-01 00:50:16: Fetched file 64674d0b352f3f44970ccdf45633c88c
2009-04-01 01:00:03: Fetched file b471d19a08768c3c969741255774d188
2009-04-01 01:08:46: Fetched file 6b6041f2736d1aaf53b247d83c3027e9
2009-04-01 02:00:52: Fetched file f03625c34b1a715483467fc7a7fd7824
2009-04-01 02:28:25: Fetched file 6f68fd1d0cfbccc0cce3cef0d493035c
2009-04-01 03:02:53: Fetched file 00056df21e2fe2b0479426d246086422
2009-04-01 03:24:14: Fetched file b358343a026c3cebcedfa3e705e95be4
2009-04-01 03:44:42: Fetched file 7c53fc4293414a499e58bf90065d5b21
2009-04-01 04:03:39: Fetched file 175c42ec4e9bf8568da547e76f0d44e7
2009-04-01 05:40:41: Fetched file 1ee20ac8af955c8015e841db148a8494
2009-04-01 06:05:17: Fetched file d7f61b84ca71352d02aa4e0533ede899
2009-04-01 06:17:03: Fetched file 1d8999623330571701c5477661dfe966
2009-04-01 06:27:20: Fetched file 1d8999623330571701c5477661dfe966
2009-04-01 06:39:38: Fetched file 1d8999623330571701c5477661dfe966
2009-04-01 06:51:00: Fetched file 1c4a956102faeb1464ceb515341f5db5
2009-04-01 07:20:54: Fetched file 89b39629d4f6ed0b3e3a512048d40255
2009-04-01 08:03:55: Fetched file 1ec23bcdd3502ce5c3b7be73de7d5587
2009-04-01 08:13:32: Fetched file 1ec23bcdd3502ce5c3b7be73de7d5587
2009-04-01 08:37:13: Fetched file 4e7f336d42aef2a6a7c50fa9d7d669eb
2009-04-01 09:07:27: Fetched file a78790a66ccfcfe1e7d8d666d3461b823
2009-04-01 09:58:31: Fetched file 1e37319935089212793c75fece02ae67
2009-04-01 10:40:01: Fetched file fd6b931dbdf2137f337841d98ab968b2
2009-04-01 10:54:23: Fetched file 1e2cc5abe790a85557505807a2baed64
2009-04-01 11:25:18: Fetched file 0f3b5bacad9efbcb6124533c9e7e3fb8
2009-04-01 11:38:46: Fetched file c3f086e04ec5a01331fe4281406acffa
2009-04-01 11:45:45: Fetched file c3f086e04ec5a01331fe4281406acffa
2009-04-01 11:58:00: Fetched file b45c09c840bb06d40fdd853db061b446
2009-04-01 12:42:04: Fetched file 1996913b0f41066524cfda77a0639c40
2009-04-01 14:32:22: Fetched file 53797d41ef9b03948a1f64f4b6b55b22
2009-04-01 16:45:03: Fetched file f476202258f92ba5296dbf7f6a187174
2009-04-01 17:06:28: Fetched file ebea5fd1bcefb76b86f428fd1afbe3bb
2009-04-01 17:50:11: Fetched file 00813da813a9e07574b74dc761e44fe
2009-04-01 18:27:24: Fetched file b220d1adf26ebad1c7fb2f5c1487e590
2009-04-01 19:06:08: Fetched file 439f7f46d76a205983445dbe3b2a3754
2009-04-01 19:21:21: Fetched file 9337b5bc0af455250924cc714713a372
2009-04-01 20:35:00: Fetched file 827d0db85ef8920fff581326fbf8c0222
2009-04-01 21:12:58: Fetched file e543e84aa7fb63904b8fd68bc98596d8
2009-04-01 21:31:22: Fetched file 32bbdef4338946b2b40d247ab13406df
2009-04-01 22:14:42: Fetched file ba37dc3bb28b336f976b6d8528aea898
```



# Current Threat Profiles

## Waledac

- Common Channels & Cloaked Commands

No. -	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
12	0.003983	192.168.214.128	97.89.111.188	HTTP	POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
13	0.004107	97.89.111.188	192.168.214.128	TCP	http > 1078 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3844 win=64240 Len=0
14	0.054688	192.168.214.128	84.16.228.132	TCP	1079 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0 MSS=1460
15	0.065005	84.16.228.132	192.168.214.128	TCP	http > 1079 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
16	0.065058	192.168.214.128	84.16.228.132	TCP	1079 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=64240 Len=0
17	0.065265	192.168.214.128	84.16.228.132	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
18	0.065386	192.168.214.128	84.16.228.132	HTTP	POST /dneaneslo.png HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
19	0.065486	84.16.228.132	192.168.214.128	TCP	http > 1079 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=201 win=64240 Len=0
20	0.065499	84.16.228.132	192.168.214.128	TCP	http > 1079 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1158 win=64240 Len=0
21	0.294410	192.168.214.128	192.168.214.2	DNS	Standard query PTR 188.111.89.97.in-addr.arpa
22	0.294850	192.168.214.128	192.168.214.2	DNS	Standard query PTR 188.111.89.97.in-addr.arpa
23	0.415057	192.168.214.2	192.168.214.128	DNS	Standard query response PTR 97-89-111-188.
24	0.415945	192.168.214.128	192.168.214.2	DNS	Standard query PTR 132.228.16.84.in-addr.arpa
25	0.422055	192.168.214.2	192.168.214.128	DNS	Standard query response PTR 97-89-111-188.
26	0.423082	192.168.214.128	192.168.214.2	DNS	Standard query PTR 132.228.16.84.in-addr.arpa
27	0.833099	192.168.214.2	192.168.214.128	DNS	Standard query response PTR 84.16.228.132.in-addr.arpa
28	0.841080	192.168.214.2	192.168.214.128	DNS	Standard query response PTR 84.16.228.132.in-addr.arpa
29	79.932978	192.168.214.128	192.168.214.2	DNS	Standard query response PTR 84.16.228.132.in-addr.arpa

```
[-] Frame 18 (1011 bytes on wire, 1011 captured)
[-] Ethernet II, Src: vmware_ee:15:5c:46:81:55, Dst: 192.168.214.128
[-] Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.214.128, Dst: 84.16.228.132
[-] Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1079, Dst Port: 80
  Source port: 1079 (1079)
  Destination port: http (80)
  Sequence number: 201 (relative to 192.168.214.128)
  [Next sequence number: 1158]
  Acknowledgement number: 1 (relative to 84.16.228.132)
  Header length: 20 bytes
  Flags: 0x0018 (PSH, ACK)
  Window size: 64240
```


Follow TCP stream

Stream Content

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Referer: Mozilla
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
X-Request-Kind-Code: nodes
User-Agent: Mozilla
Host: 97.89.111.188
Content-Length: 3627
Cache-Control: no-cache

E03GV_zi1Ti104yz8H-ZrF51ghXZ35eB5csE2TvcPPVYQh-dmSGPj8eww2qia-
pdc7kZndiNVI5b5cisEFE6BRIT53cLN9YAR28wj4UdP39mwoH0yDF3R8ZVMTfuJvc9iXt1nj5txeBotLiCwmr5Q
M5c9UupbptWGknrMIip7ct9lni2Jfi2fdog9DGLR389Mw14wFE1BYV4LubDDc0B55A9HaE6bZwZT2Y_47wdph4_1
```

# Current Threat Profiles



## The Conficker Timeline<sup>[2]</sup>

- **Aug 20, 2008:** First exploit seen, Gimmiv Trojan
- **Oct 23, 2008:** Microsoft Issues MS08-067 Patch
- **Oct 26, 2008:** PoC Widely Available
- **Nov 20, 2008:** Conficker.A observed
  - **Nov 26, 2008:** Time Bomb #1 (DGA – 250)
  - **Dec 01, 2008:** Time Bomb #2 (TrafficConverter)
- **Dec 28, 2008:** Conficker.B observed
  - **Jan 01, 2009:** Time Bomb #3 (DGA – 250)
- **Feb 16, 2008:** Conficker.B++ observed
- **Mar 05, 2008:** Conficker.C updates B/B++
  - **Apr 01, 2009:** Time Bomb #4 (DGA – 50k)
- **Apr 08, 2009:** P2P updates spread through Conficker.C
  - Connected to Waledac Servers


# Current Threat Profiles

## Notable Conficker Incidents<sup>[2]</sup>

- **Dec 29, 2008:** Sheffield Hospitals
  - 800+ Systems Infected
- **Jan 06, 2009:** UK Ministry of Defense
  - 2 Weeks Damage Control
- **Jan 15, 2009:** French Navy Computer Network<sup>[3]</sup>
  - Grounds aircrafts, flight plans cannot be downloaded
- **Feb 13, 2009:** German Federal Defense<sup>[3]</sup>
  - 100 Est. Systems Infected
- **Mar 2009:** CBS News Infected
- **Mar 24, 2009:** British Director of Parliamentary ICT<sup>[3]</sup>
  
- ***Millions Impacted Worldwide***
  - Denial of Service
  - Administrative Overtime

# Current Threat Profiles

- Seven Month Peak After Disclosure / Patch<sup>[1]</sup>



# Virut: A Modern Hybrid

## Profile

- Parasitic file infector
  - Infects EXE, SCR
  - Entry Point Obscuring
  - Targets Servers - Infects web documents (Virut.CE)
    - HTM, PHP, ASP
  - Newer variants use cavities
  - Infecting Your Files Since 2007
- C&C Channels
  - Hardcoded IRC
  - Downloads multiple components / spambots

# Virut: A Modern Hybrid

## Profile: Virut's Evolution

- **Virut.A** (May 2006)
  - Highest detected activity in September 2008
    - *Most Prevalent Virus 2008-2009*
    - *Here We Go Again – May 2009*
  - Searches & Infects Executables
  - Simple Decrypting Loop (XOR)
  - Hardcoded C&C Channel (IRC)
    - Random Username
    - Accepts Instructions (GET)


# Virut: A Modern Hybrid

## Profile: Virut's Evolution

- **Virut.CE** (Feb 2009)
  - Highest detected activity in April 2009
  - Multiple Appending Infection Routines
    - *Type 1* – EPO, Multiple Decoders (Cavity)
    - *Type 2* – Non-EPO, Multiple Decoders (Cavity)
    - *Type 3* – EPO, Single Decoder (Non-Cavity)
    - *Type 4* – Non-EPO, Single Decoder (Non-Cavity)
  - Targets Client & Servers
    - Injects IFrame into HTM, PHP, ASP
  - Memory Resident
    - Hooks NTDLL APIs
    - Injects into winlogon.exe
  - More Hardcoded C&C Servers (IRC)

# Virut: A Modern Hybrid

- Prevalence & Impact: Gearing Up






# Virut: A Modern Hybrid

## Prevalence & Impact

- Virut vs. Mass Mailers
  - Mass Mailing Hybrids Created
    - Netsky, Bagle, MyDoom, MyTob
  - Outbreak in Korea (W32/Virut.A)
  - Uses Mass Mailing Worms as Catalyst
    - ++Zombies
    - ++Profit
    - Any executables through spam templates / spambots


# Virut: A Modern Hybrid

- **Prevalence & Impact: Mass Conquered**



# W32/Virut.CE

Hybrid Demonstration



# Combating Modern Threats

## Conficker, Waledac et al: Layered Security

- Webfiltering: DGA, Fast Flux
  - High Capacity, Real Time
- Effective Antivirus: Reassembly, Server Polymorphism
  - End Point & **Gateway**
    - *Conficker Disables Host Security*
- Intrusion Prevention
  - MS08-067 & Future Exploits
- Antispam
  - Spam still very prevalent (McColo, 3FN)
  - Waledac node / server proxy technique
- Firewall
  - *Trojan Downloaders on Unwanted Ports*
  - End Point & Gateway

### *Conficker Case Study Sources*

1: Fortinet's FortiGate and Worldwide Intelligence Systems

2: Byron Acohido: <http://lastwatchdog.com/evolution-conficker-globe-spanning-worm>

3: Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conficker>

# Combating Modern Threats

## Policies & Education

- Incidence Response
  - Guidelines / Response Scenarios
  - Practice
    - Cyber Storm
- Memos/Seminars
  - Common Attacks
  - Security Bulletins / RSS
- Patch Management
  - OS & Browser Critical
- Browser Lockdown
  - ActiveX, Javascript, Flash, etc
- Wireless Lockdown
  - Inherently Insecure



# Combating Modern Threats

## Policies & Education

- Data Leak Prevention
  - Very Broad Area
  - UTM & IT Administration
    - Password Enforcement
- Mobile Devices
  - Roaming Policies
  - Connectivity Guidelines
    - Bluetooth, etc.
    - Autorun
- Encryption
  - VPN
  - SSL/TLS/(Open)PGP
  - CryptoFS
    - TrueCrypt



# Bonus Slide

## Top Malware in Brazil

*January 01 – May 31 2009*

Rank	Detection	Description
#1	<a href="#">W32/Netsky.X@mm</a>	Netsky variant, DoS attacks three websites
#2	HTML/Virut.CE	Infected server pages (HTM, PHP, ASP) from W32/Virut.CE
#3	<a href="#">JS/Feebs.fam@mm</a>	Attaches .HTA file (4kb). Spreads through encrypted JS instructions.
#4	Adware/AdClicker	General Adware Family
#5	JS/Agent.AOI!tr	JS trojan downloader

# Questions ?

---

Thank You!